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I. Introduction
A great deal of attention has been focused in recent years on the theory and practicability of partial equilibrium welfare analysis in markets for ordinary goods and services. Th research has resulted in a better understanding of the theoretical relationship betwe product prices, incomes, and individual and social welfare, and in the specification o rigorous methodologies for theoretical and empirical analysis of the welfare aspects policies affecting prices, market structures, and the availability of products.
The markets for financial instruments, specifically the markets for credit and deb have so far escaped careful scrutiny and have not benefitted equally from these advances in welfare theory. For certain purposes, it may be useful and proper to treat the markets for credit and debt as exactly analogous to ordinary goods and services markets. However, f the purposes of individual and social welfare analysis these markets deserve separate consideration. Agents' behavior in the markets for credit and debt reflect and large summarize their intertemporal allocations of resources between ordinary goods and services markets in different time periods. Since welfare analysis of this market behavior mu build upon the underlying structure of individuals' decision-making, and since this decisionmaking explicitly involves the dimension of time, the welfare analysis must also explicitly recognize and account for the role of time.
What little attention welfare analysis of credit and debt markets has received, eith directly or indirectly, has been largely confined to the banking literature where su problems as the relationship of interest rates on borrowing and lending to individual a social welfare are of obvious relevance to issues of banking regulation and banking mark structure analysis. Typified in papers by Rhoades [9] , Benston [1] , and Policano [7] , th work has been mostly empirical and has relied heavily on tenuous analogies drawn betw ordinary markets and the markets for financial instruments. These analogies have bee fundamentally ad hoc, and have been offered without explicit theoretical justification.
This paper provides a solution to this problem which is both theoretically justifiab and empirically useable. In section II, individuals' demands for financial instruments ar derived from a generalized Fisherian intertemporal consumption model. These deman are expressed in terms of the future value of the borrowing and lending undertaken by the individual in the initial period of an arbitrary time horizon, and are dependent on the current period prices or discount rates. In section III an exact measure of the influence these prices on individual welfare is constructed, observable surplus measures are defin which are analogous to ordinary consumer surplus, and the relationship of these observable surplus measures to the theoretically exact measure is specified. It is shown that wit proper adaptation and interpretation, the entire spirit and substance of Willig's [11; 1 well-known solution to the problem of estimating individual welfare in ordinary marke can be carried over to the particular type of intertemporal decision-making which gives rise to market demands for financial instruments. Section IV illustrates how the observable surplus measures can be calculated from the usual interest rate and present value form which demands for financial instruments commonly take in theoretical and empirical work. Contrary to what appears to be generally presumed, the proper observable surplus measures which bear a clear and definite relationship to accepted theoretical measures of individual and social welfare are not properly calculated as simple areas under observable demands for financial instruments. However, it is shown that simple adaptations in the calculation of those areas suffice to enable definite and precise welfare calculations to be made. The final section illustrates how the theoretical methods constructed in the paper can be applied to calculate the welfare costs of bank mergers. Results of simple statistical tests challenge the conventional wisdom associating mergers that cause large increases in market concentration with large welfare losses to bank customers.
II. The Model of Individual Behavior
Individuals are assumed to possess a T + 1 period planning horizon over which the currently prepared to make financing decisions. They are assumed to possess a prefe ordering over commodities in the T+ 1 periods with the necessary properties to perm representation at fixed commodity prices by a utility function U(Co, C1,..., CT) th continuous, twice-differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave in consump tion levels Ck, k = 0,..., T. The individual is endowed with initial wealth w and exp future incomes yi,..., yr with certainty. Consumers are assumed to have access to an of financial instruments with which to finance their intertemporal consumption p which they contract for in the initial period. These instruments are partitioned into groups: those that constitute obligations of the consumer to pay $1 in some future p and those that represent the obligations of others to pay the consumer $1 in some f period. The former group, which will be called "loans," and the latter group c "deposits," are available in maturities of from one to T periods. Let Lk ? O, k = 1, be the total number of obligations to deliver $1 at the beginning of period k which consumer sells, and let Dk ? O, k = 1,..., T, be the total number of obligations to re $1 at the beginning of period k which the consumer buys.
It is clear that if the individual contracts for any of these obligations it will affect t amount of funds available for k th period consumption. Any Dk held, representing prom to receive funds, will increase consumption possibilities in period k and any Lk he representing promises to pay funds, will reduce them. For each future period total consumption will be ' Ck = k + Dk -Lk k =1,..., T. (1) The consumer must take future incomes yk as given, b consumption levels by purchases and sales of deposit a period. The utility function defined over consumption levels Ck, which will not be realized until future periods, may be transformed into one defined over current period consumption plus a commitment in the current period to a financing plan that will achieve the desired consumption plan. A modified version of the conventional Fisherian framework is obtained by substituting (1) into the utility function and writing it as U(Co, yj + D, -L,,..., y + DT -LT). (2) Any particular financing plan will affect Co, the level of current period consumption, in a way that will be described in detail below. For now, however, it is sufficient to simply recognize the properties of the utility function as it is written in (2) by noting that the strict quasiconcavity of the utility function in the Ck, together with the linearity of (1), guarantee the strict quasiconcavity of (2) in Co, the Dk and the Lk. In effect, this substitution allows the intertemporal consumption problem to be reduced to a problem of choosing the current period consumption and "savings" levels, and of allocating that savings to credit and debt instruments.2
Individuals face fixed current period prices pk at which they sell their obligations Lk, and fixed current period prices dk at which they buy others' obligations Dk. These prices are equivalent to "discount rates" calculated from effective single-period interest rates or yields applicable over the term of the credit or debt contract. If rk and 6k are the effective single-period interest rates on loan and deposit contracts of term k, respectively, then pk -1 / (1 + rk)k and dk 1/ (1 +6k)k. Since 0 < rk ( oo and 0 < 6k oo, O < pk ? 1 and O < dk ? i.3
In the current period, the individual maximizes utility by choosing a level of current period consumption Co and an optimal combination of purchases and sales of the Dk and Lk to finance the (implicit) intertemporal consumption plan. That choice is constrained by the requirement that current period consumption, plus net expenditure on financial instruments of all maturities, not exceed initial wealth. Total outlays for deposit instruments of maturity k are dk Dk, and receipts for loan instruments of maturity k sold are pk Lk. Net current period expenditure on financial instruments of all maturities is the sum over all maturities of the difference between what is paid for the purchase of deposit contracts and what is received from the sale of loan contracts. In the current period, therefore, the individual must choose the level of current consumption and a financing plan whose present value does not exceed initial wealth:
1. The consumption level achievable in any future period will also be affected by borrowing or lending undertaken in periods prior to the current one. This can be easily allowed for but will be ignored here for simplicity. 2. The general structure of (2) is, in principle, similar to that of Morishima [6] , but is less restrictive since it does not require the assumption of separability of the utility function between consumption and financing variables.
3. Any loan or deposit, regardless of the particular payment terms, may be thought to consist of the current sale or purchase of several instruments as they are defined here, at different "long rates" 6k or rk. See Hicks [3, 145] .
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The individual's problem is to choose non-negative values of Co, Dk and Lk to mize (2), subject to (3) . Under the assumptions about the utility function a solution problem exists and is unique.4 It is worth emphasizing that even though the de problem is cast in terms of actions taken in the current period alone, the individu constrained to make simple allocations of funds between the current and various periods. By appropriate purchases and sales of financial instruments in the curren intertemporal transfer of funds between any two arbitrary periods within the horizon can be achieved. Note that the right-hand sides of (7) , which depend on loan and deposit prices a 4. Non-negativity restrictions and the linearity of the constraint equation in (3) guarantee that the co is closed, bounded, and therefore compact. The continuity of U(-) assures that a solution exists. The con constraint set beneath this boundary, together with the strict quasiconcavity of the objective function, gu the solution is unique. 5. These derivatives exist and are well-defined as long as the consumer is not locally satiated interior solution in the Ck, k=O,..., T are the (signed) "Fisherian" demands for loan and deposit obligations, analogous to the Marshallian demands for ordinary goods and services. It is crucial to notice, however, that these derivatives give the Fisherian demands for loan and deposit contracts in terms of their future values, rather than their present values.
Similar application of the envelope theorem to (5) shows that the price partial derivatives of the expenditure function give the (signed) Hicksian, or utility-constant, demands.
It is easy to show that e (p, d, v) is concave in prices and monotoni Concavity in prices, together with (8) , establish that the own-substitutio and loan price changes have the expected signs.6
III. Individual Welfare and Observable Surplus
In this section an exact measure of the effects of deposit and loan individual welfare will be constructed. This measure will generally be ever, observable measures can be specified that will approximate the measure to a high degree of accuracy. Borrower and depositor surplu to ordinary consumer surplus, will be used for this purpose. When th are properly defined, and only when so defined, arguments exactly Willig [11; 12] can be used to establish a clear relationship between and rigorous notions of individual welfare under a wide range of circums in theory and practice.
The fundamental tool for the analysis of individual welfare is the we function, A (p, dipo, do, wo), defined as the minimum current perio prices (p, d) to make the consumer just as well-off as at some base pr do) and wo. Implicitly, the wealth-compensation function is defined a v (p, d, (p, dPO pO, do o)) v(p, do,w0
An important property of the wealth-compensation function may be see (9) with respect to prices pk and dk, and using (7) In modern welfare theory, the "compensating variation" [3] is widely accepted as a proper measure of the effect on consumer welfare of an ordinary commodity price change.7 6 . That is, an increase in pk (decrease in interest rate rk) causes a substitution in favor of Lk along a given indifference curve, and an increase in dk (decrease in deposit rate Sk) causes a substitution out of Dk along a given indifference curve. 7 . There are, of course, many other such measures. However, the Hicksian compensating and equivalent variation are the most common. For brevity, the analysis here will focus on the compensating variation alone, though all important results can be derived in terms of the equivalent variation as well.
An analogous compensating variation in wealth, CV, may be defined here as the wealth adjustment which is necessary after a loan or deposit price change in order to leave the consumer just as well off as under the base situation. CV is defined implicitly as v(p, d, wo + CV) v(po, do, w0).
The compensating variation and the wealth-compensation function are very closely related.
In particular, wo + CV = (p, d p d, wdo o) and, of course wo A(p0, do 0p, do, wo).
Noting the dependence of CV on the two sets of prices, CV(p, dp, do,wo) = (p, dlpo, do ,w)-(p, do 0, do,wo). (11) In view of (10), CV can be represented by a path-independent line integral of the gradient of the wealth-compensation function or, simply, as areas under the Hicksian demands for financial instruments. Using the relationshp of A(-) to CV and an important theorem in welfare economics, the consumer's indirect utility function may be written in terms of CV and the consumer's wealth. This theorem, originally due to Hurwicz and Uzawa [4, 119] and recalled by Willig [11, 53] , shows that a demand-generating indirect utility function like v(-), derived from an ordinary utility function possessing the quasiconcavity and differentiability properties assumed in the second section above, is transformable by a strictly monotone increasing function into another demand-generating indirect utility function defined in terms of the wealth compensation function. Their findings are recalled here as Proposition 1.
For v(-) as in (4) and A(-) as in (9) The statement of the theorem follows directly. Q.E.D. 8 . The function A(j, dip, d, w), of course, possesses all of the demand-generating propertie does. To verify this, differentiate the l.h.s. of (P.2) with respect to any price and wealth, then use ( This proposition constitutes a major step towards observability and measurability of consumer's welfare by permitting the ordinary indirect utility function, which gives an ordinal index of consumer welfare measured in unobservable and incomensurate "utils," to be transformed into an equivalent ordinal index of consumer welfare measured in observable "dollar," or wealth units. A strict corollary to this proposition, originally noted by Willig [11, 53] for the case of ordinary commodity price changes, follows directly from the definition of CV in (11) The appropriate multidimensional surplus measure for this purpose is the sum of areas under sequentially shifted Fisherian demands for loans and deposits, when those demands take their price and future value forms. For d and ' arbitrary but fixed, define depositor surplus, DS, and borrower surplus, BS, as and lower bounds on the error in using BS and DS to estimate CV can be reliably calculated. Since Willig's results are well-known, and since all of his approximation results 9 . A has been defined in terms of a particular sequence of price changes, taking the deposit price changes first and then the loan price changes. Unlike CV which is the sum of path-independent integrals of Hicksian demands, the value of A is path-dependent and does depend on the sequence of prices chosen. The choice of different paths will not alter any of the general relationships between A and CV given above, but it will alter the magnitudes of A and of the error term, as well as the "tightness" of the bounds calculable on that error. The particular sequence of price changes used above was chosen arbitrarily, and is neither necessary nor optimal in any sense. carry over to the present case when the proper specifications of borrower and depositor surplus in (12) are substituted for ordinary consumer surplus in his derivations, it will not be necessary to catalog all of those same results and their derivations here. The reader with special needs or interests in the details of these arguments is referred to Jehle [5] . T/ IA I r7a/2.
IV. Surplus Calculation Using Interest Rates
The demand functions for loan and deposit instruments u welfare and surplus results were derived, are defined in their p in order to be able to make easy use of Willig's large body o the purpose of establishing the necessary analogies to Willig straightforward approach to take. However, for most empir theoretical purposes, it is usually more convenient to work present value of loan or deposit contracts-the amounts rather than with discount rates and the future value of co estimating demand functions and calculating surpluses. The t straightforward and should provide an easier and more intui cases. It will be shown, however, that borrower and deposi servable measures of individual welfare, cannot be simply i deposit and loan demand functions when those functions are rates. The analogies between surplus measures appropriate to demands for financial instruments and those appropriate to demands for ordinary goods and services, which have been drawn by Rhoades [9] and others, are thus shown to be subject to previously unrecognized conceptual and computational errors. The demand functions Lk(p, d, w) and Dk(p, d, w) are defined above as the future values, k periods hence, of the loan and deposit contracts sold or brought in the current period. Prices pk = 1 / (1 + rk)k and dk = 1 / (I + 6k)k of these contracts are the "discount rates" which can be applied to the demand functions to obtain the present value of the contracts in the current period. Borrower and depositor surplus, calculated as in Proposition 3 from the usual interest rate forms of loan and deposit demand functions, are directly substitutable for BS and DS in Proposition 2. All results relating these surpluses to CV and individual welfare remain unchanged when this method of calculation is used."
It is important to notice that DS and BS are not simply equal to the areas between two interest rate levels underneath the interest rate forms of the observable Fisherian loan and deposit demand functions. The correct surplus measures are those areas "scaled" by the maturity of the loan or deposit in terms of the number of standard periods, k, and "discounted" over the range of integration by the factor (1 + z)-'. The intuition of this is perhaps clearest in the case of single-period lending represented in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 , the single-period deposit rate 6, is graphed against the amount of funds supplied in the current period, D*, and the discounted transformation DF / (1 + 61). The area C can be thought of heuristically as approximating the minimum interest income that must accrue to the depositor over the period in order to induce him to supply the amount D* at the beginning of the period. The total of the areas A, B and C is the amount of interest income that actually does accrue to the depositor over the period. The excess of what is received over what is minimally necessary -areas A + B, or the simple surplusmeasures a sort of surplus in income that the depositor holder receives over the period. This income, however, is not paid to the individual until the end of the period. The compensating variation in wealth, on the other hand, measures the adjustment in wealth the individual requires at the beginning of the period to make him just as well off (in this case) holding no deposits as he would be holding D* paying 6i over the period. In effect, the area A + B measures the sum of (infinitely small) incremental income surpluses which will not be paid until the end of the period. They must, therefore, be "discounted" to 11 . Notice also that the wealth elasticities calculated from the future value forms Lk and Dk and used in the Taking the case of loan demand and borrower surplus as an example, some illustrative calculations based on Proposition 4 are presented in Table I . The entries in each of the last The qualitative aspects of bank mer Chamberlinian analysis of the relation market "performance" in monopolistica mergers, insofar as they lead to increased banking concentration, can be expected to result in higher market loan rates and lower market deposit rates. Many empirical studies have tested this basic hypothesis and have estimated the relationship between loan and deposit rate levels and measures of market concentration.12 While such calculations abound in the literature, for illustrative purposes here the results of Heggestad and Mingo [2] can be taken to represent a reasonable consensus in this literature. They estimate that an increase of 1.98 basis points in the loan rate and a decrease of .27 basis points in the deposit rate can be anticipated for every 100 basis points increase in the Herfindhal, H = Isi2, where 0 ? s1 ? 1 is the market share of bank i, and the index runs over all banks in the relevant market. A merger between banks i and j, having market shares si and sj, will cause a change in the Herfindhal of A H = 2 si sj > 0. If the pre-merger market interest rates are ro and 60, then the expected post-merger interest rates will be r' =ro + (1.98) (2 sisj) > ro and 6' = (60 -.27 (2 sisj) < 60. The larger the market shares of the merging banks, therefore, the larger the change in concentration with merger and the larger the change in interest rates expected. It is therefore generally believed that a merger which "significantly" increases concentation will tend to have "significantly" adverse effects on borrowers and depositors.
To apply such rules of thumb based on market shares and changes in concentration when evaluating merger proposals is subject to a number of a priori objections. For one, a merger causing a given change in concentration and a given change in interest rates should be expected to have very different effects on welfare depending on the depth and elasticity of demand in the relevant market, as well as on the absolute level of interest rates prevailing at the time of the merger. Simple market-share rules fail to capture these important influences.
Building on the results of the Structure-Performance (SP) literature, borrower and depositor surplus techniques can be used to calculate dollar-figure estimates of the welfare losses likely to be suffered by borrowers and depositors as a result of a particular bank merger in a given market. The method is straightforward. First, estimates of the relevant market-level loan and deposit demand functions can be made from historical data on market interest rates, income, and other economic and demographic data. Then, the expected interest rate changes can be calculated using the estimated relationships between interest rate levels and measures of market concentration from the SP literature. The welfare costs to borrowers and depositors can then be approximated by the changes borrower and depositor surplus.
Elsewhere, this technique has been used to calculate borrower and depositor welfar losses in a sample of 28 merger cases considered by the FDIC over the period 1970-79 Assuming for simplicity that all loans and deposits had a term of one period, pooled cross-section and time series data were used to estimate representative per-capita deman for loans and deposits. The 28 market-level demands were then obtained by evaluatin these estimated functions at the values of the independent variables obtaining in eac market at the time of the proposed merger.13
12. See Rhoades [9] for an excellent survey of this literature. The market shares of the merging banks in the sample produced changes in market concentration measured by the Herfindhal ranging from 2 to 1,106 basis points. Estimates of the post-merger interest rate levels were calculated as described earlier using the results of Heggestad and Mingo, and estimates of the welfare costs of the mergers in the sample were computed using Proposition 3. Welfare costs varied considerably over the mergers in the sample, and these calculations are reported in Table II A simple F-test was applied to the data in Table II to test the null hypotheses that there is no correlation between changes in borrower surplus and changes in concentration, and no correlation between changes in depositor surplus and changes in concentration. The calculated F-statistics in the two cases were .138 and .388, respectively, Both are less than the critical value of 1.38, and so the null hypotheses that there is no correlation between changes in concentration and changes in either borrower or depositor welfare cannot be rejected at the 25% significance level.
While rough and imperfect in ways, these simple calculations are nonetheless suggestive. They cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating market shares and changes in concentration to the expected welfare losses from bank mergers, and they direct attention to the importance of the market interest rate level and the depth and elasticity of demand in determining the welfare impact of particular mergers in particular markets. The importance of these factors illustrates the advantages of borrower and depositor surplus methods over traditional methods of merger analysis. First, they provide observable and accurate indices of welfare change which bear a well-defined relation to accepted theoretical measures of welfare. Second, they provide a means of gauging welfare costs which is sensitive to market-specific characteristics of the particular banking market being considered. Finally, by providing dollar estimates of the welfare costs of mergers to depositors and to borrowers, these techniques permit a more careful weighing of the costs of a merger against its benefits, and they help give policy-makers greater insight into the distributional consequences of their decisions. 14. For a fuller treatment of these issues in general, and in the kind of spatial market analysis typical in banking, see [5] .
Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to prove Proposition 2 and to give more detail to the precise relationship between observable measures of depositor and borrower surplus and the compensating variation in wealth. All results and methods of derivation follow exactly, by analogy, those of Willig [11; 12] . No effort is made to reproduce the considerable body of approximation results reported by Willig. Instead, the purpose here is to sketch the basic argument and to acquaint the reader having more specific needs with the modifications which will be necessary to interpret Willig's results in the context of demands for financial instruments. Terms have been defined consistently so that the reader may refer directly to Willig's larger body of results, without the need to translate notation. Finally, for simplicity in the exposition here, only the case of single price changes for an individual will be treated. Proofs and more extended arguments for cases of multiple price changes and aggregation are provided in [5] .
Consider first the effect on individual welfare of a single loan-price change from p k to pk' for instrument Lk(p, d, wo) given base wealth wo. Let p0 (p0..., pO) and p' (p0 ... .. ...P).
Define CV and A as in (11) Consideration of loan-price increases (loan interest rate decreases) from pO to p', and depositprice decreases (deposit interest rate increases) from do to d', lead, by a parallel derivation, to (A4) and (A5) also. However, in these cases, (12) shows that BS, DS and A will be negative.
In the limit, as r7 approaches -7, (A4) shows that the compensating variation in wealth may be This exact relationship between the compensating variation and the observable surpluses when the wealth elasticity is constant gives rise to the final approximation result, Proposition 2(iii), which is simpler and which may be useful when r7 is constant or when 7-and 77 are not too far apart. The proof consists of applying the Taylor approximation (1 + t)l(/-'7'7) 1 + t/(1 -I7) + rt2/2(1 --7)2 to (A6) and rearranging to obtain T/I AI |, ra/2. (A7) Willig [12] has compiled a table of numerical values for the boun given in Proposition 2(i) and (iii). Notation has been defined so that the those calculations.
